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Boise State University 
 
October 2013 was not a great time to be on the health care reform team in the 
Obama White House. The rollout for healthcare.gov – the website that had been set up 
for the federal insurance exchange mandated by the 2010 Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (aka Obamacare) – had been bungled, with only a few thousand 
sign-ups a month after the site’s launch. Pressure was growing for the administration to 
appoint a high-profile manager to coordinate inter-agency efforts to solve the 
technological problems, improve communications, and implement the immense and 
complex health care legislation to give Americans plenty of time to sign up for new 
insurance plans before the December 23, 2013 deadline.  
This kind of bureaucratic solution to a major, salient policy challenge was not 
unique; indeed, it has been so commonplace over the past several decades that the 
phenomenon has its own term: czar. From managing the war on drugs to overseeing 
efforts to avert Y2K disaster, czars have long been a preferred response to coordinating 
policy action that required cooperation across the myriad agencies, offices, and 
departments of the federal government. Czars have not always been an uncontroversial 
administrative solution, however, and no president knew more than Barack Obama just 
how contentious the usage of presidential policy czars really could be. Following his 
2008 defeat of Senator John McCain (R-AZ), controversy grew over not only the new 
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administration’s alleged over-reliance on czars but also whether the staffing practice 
itself was constitutional (Vaughn and Villalobos 2012).  
Several years later, the furor over czars in the Obama White House has largely 
subsided, but the czar phenomenon itself remains cloaked in misunderstanding. In this 
article I attempt to resolve much of the uncertainty and unease surrounding the role 
policy czars have played and continue to play in the contemporary presidency. In doing 
so I first discuss what constitutes a czar. I then examine why czars have been 
controversial and, in light of that controversy, provide a theoretical explanation for why 
presidents continue to use them. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the key factors 
involved in successful czar policy leadership and how presidents can better utilize their 
czars, suggestions that can help enhance presidential success while minimizing public 
controversy.  
Defining “Czar” 
The term “czar” has been bandied about enough by politicos that it has become 
accepted shorthand for an influential administration official involved in a central policy 
area. For example, former George H.W. Bush deputy press secretary Alixe Glen notes a 
czar is “someone who can run it all.  In a town like Washington that has so many 
fiefdoms and committees with long acronyms, calling someone simply a ‘czar’ gets the 
point across” (Trausch 1989). Obama Administration spokesman Tommy Vietor sounded 
a similar refrain as he sought to tame the aforementioned staffing controversy in the 
administration’s early days: “The term ‘czar’ is largely a media creation to make jobs that 
have existed under multiple administrations sound more exciting.  Every president since 
Nixon has hired smart and qualified people to coordinate between agencies and the White 
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House” (Markman 2009). This opinion appears to be shared across the ideological 
spectrum, as Gene Healy (2009) of the libertarian CATO Institute suggests that “… ‘czar’ 
is a media-coined, catchall term for presidential assistants tasked with coordinating policy 
on issues that cut across departmental lines” and Bradley Patterson (2009) - whose 
government service included stints in the Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford Administrations - 
has testified that “‘czar’ is not an official government title of anybody; it is a vernacular 
of executive branch public administration, harking back—in one account—at least to the 
Coolidge years.  It is a label now used loosely hereabouts, especially by the media.” 
These examples reinforce the notion that “czar” is evocative of a vague 
administrative concept, yet the term still lacks a conceptual definition that is both precise 
and commonly accepted by political practitioners and pundits alike.  Indeed, even former 
czars have trouble with the definition; as former Homeland Security Adviser Fran 
Townsend once noted: “I’m not sure what a czar is, or what it does” (Newsmax 2009). 
Such uncertainty has led some to decry the meaninglessness of the term, such as law 
professor Aaron Saiger (2011, 2582), who has written, “In short, whether an official is 
called a ‘czar’ tells you as much about her formal organizational position as whether she 
works for a ‘department,’ ‘agency,’ or an ‘administration,’ which is to say, nothing.” 
Similarly, according to the Congressional Research Service, “For some, the term is being 
used to quickly convey an appointee’s title (e.g., climate ‘czar’) in shorthand.  For others, 
it is, perhaps, being used to convey a sense that power is being centralized in the White 
House or certain entities.  When used in the political-science literature, the term generally 
refers to White House policy coordination or an intense focus by the appointee on an 
issue of great magnitude” (Schwemle et al. 2010, 1).  
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 In what stands as the most thorough examination of the legal challenges 
potentially posed by czars, Mitchel Sollenberger and Mark Rozell (2012, 7) define a czar 
as “an executive branch official who is not confirmed by the Senate and is exercising 
final decision-making authority that often entails controlling budgetary programs, 
administering/coordinating a policy area, or otherwise promulgating rules, regulations, 
and orders that bind either government officials and/or the private sector.”1 This is a 
thoughtful and laudable attempt to operationalize an informal and contested 
administrative concept. However, this article resists subscribing to that approach, 
however, and instead argues that in their attempts to formalize the term czar, 
Sollenberger and Rozell have inadvertently stripped the concept of much of its meaning. 
That is, by hinging their definition on Senate confirmation, Sollenberger and Rozell 
disqualify several individuals that have been historically referred to as czars. Indeed, 
many of the individuals that presidents have referred to publicly as czars do not qualify 
for the label under the preceding definitions. For example, the administration official 
most frequently referred to as a czar – by presidents, other politicians, pundits, and the 
American people alike –is inarguably the drug czar, today officially known as the 
Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Sollenberger and Rozell, 
however, take pains to argue that the drug czar is not an actual czar (and indeed is not 
one, per their definition). Why?  Because since 1989, the drug czar has been subject to 
Senate confirmation. Although the internal logic of their definition is sound, the fact that 
it departs so significantly from what presidents themselves apparently believe justifies at 
least some skepticism about the external validity of their definition.  
 At the same time, it is imperative to be clear about what is meant by “czar” in this 
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article.  This article contends that the most accurate use of the term is when it is applied 
to members of an administration tasked with coordination responsibilities over a 
particular policy area, typically one related to a new policy problem or priority that an 
administration is intent on solving with the full force of the federal government, or at 
least appearing to do so.  Or, as William Howell (2013, 33) notes, “‘Czar’ is political 
shorthand for a special policy adviser who is appointed by the president, without 
congressional oversight, for the purposes of coordinating and centralizing the activities of 
various executive branch offices.” Whether these individuals have received Senate 
confirmation might often be a helpful indicator, but it is not fundamental to our 
understanding. Instead, it is function that is central to this definition. Keeping the 
definitional focus on function rather than confirmation allows greater confidence that 
subsequent analysis covers this administrative phenomenon’s full range. Further, as czar 
is a rhetorical construct rather than a legal one, not hinging the definition of czar on 
confirmation allows greater conceptual consistency between how czars are talked about 
in the political realm and how they are observed by scholars.   
Why Are Czars Controversial?  
 Debates about what precisely constitutes a czar aside, the central substantive 
reason czars are controversial concerns the ramifications that presidential reliance on 
such personnel can have for the constitutional order.  Critics argue that czars represent an 
illegal and even unconstitutional extension of presidential policy making authority that 
occurs at the expense of Congress.  For instance, Representative Steve Scalise (R-LA), 
the author of legislation to block funding for many of President Obama’s czars, has 
referred to the policy advisors as “unappointed, unaccountable people who are literally 
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running a shadow government, heading up these little fiefdoms that nobody can really 
seem to identify where they are or what they’re doing” (Bravender 2011). 
Sollenberger and Rozell (2012) provide a particularly compelling argument that 
certain presidential attempts to delegate authority can violate constitutional provisions 
included in the Appointments Clause and non-delegation doctrine. They contend that 
czars constitute a “constitutional aberration” and “a direct violation of the core principles 
of a system of separation of powers and government accountability” (3) Pointing back to 
Woodrow Wilson’s appointment of Bernard Baruch to help manage the nation’s 
economic mobilization during World War I, they suggest a dangerous precedent was set 
that established a new executive branch structure that largely alleviated presidents of the 
Senate confirmation requirement and effectively concentrated power “within the 
president and his chosen agents” (Sollenberger and Rozell 2012, 51). 
Although critics voice concern over the unilateral roots of some offices that are 
said to be led by czars and others decry apparent violations of the non-delegation 
doctrine, the primary constitutional complaint concerns the Appointments Clause and the 
fact that some executive branch officials may have been inappropriately bestowed 
“substantial policymaking, regulatory or budgetary functions” (Rozell and Sollenberger 
2012, 77). The Appointments Clause dictates that the president may nominate “principal” 
(or “superior”) officers that require Senate confirmation;2 according to Sollenberger and 
Rozell, for a presidential appointment to have constitutional fidelity, any executive 
branch employee who has final authority over program budgets or the ability to 
promulgate rules, regulations, or any order that binds the government or private sector 
should require Senate confirmation.  Those that do not receive Senate confirmation yet 
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article.  The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at
Presidential Studies Quarterly, published by Wiley-Blackwell. Copyright restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1111/psq.12148
 7 
possess and/or utilize such power—in essence, those who Sollenberger and Rozell define 
as czars—do so illegally and unconstitutionally. 
This case has been made elsewhere in painstaking and persuasive ways; however, 
it is not the only interpretation of the legal situation concerning czars.3  Other equally 
learned scholars have observed the same cases as those who are critical of czars and 
come to different conclusions.  For example, according to congressional testimony 
provided by T.J. Halstead (2009), deputy assistant director of the American Law Division 
of the Congressional Research Service, “there is no substantial basis upon which it may 
be argued that the President’s selection and employment of advisers constitutes a 
fundamental violation of the terms set forth in the Constitution.” Likewise, in his 
statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution, 
University of Virginia law professor John Harrison (2009) testified he was “not aware of 
any so-called ‘Czar’ who lacks the type of appointment needed to authorize that person’s 
actions.” Going further still, Melanie Marlowe (2012, 150) argues in an essay advocating 
the unitary executive perspective toward the presidency that there is “nothing 
unconstitutional” about czars, as they are neither principal nor inferior officers under the 
appointments clause and thus have no legal authority to abuse in the first place. 
Absent legislative or judicial action, one may argue that presidents are free to staff 
their administrations within the broad guidelines set forth in the Appointments Clause 
and subsequent relevant legislation.4  Legislators such as Representative Scalise have 
attempted to alter the legal status of certain executive branch officials identified by some 
as czars, primarily by either defunding them or demanding that all such personnel be 
answerable to legislative oversight. However, to date, legislators in opposition to 
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executive branch czars have been unable to reverse or limit presidential appointment 
powers in such manner—save for one instance that had more to do with the fear of a 
government shutdown amid a debate over federal spending (Bravender 2011). Even then, 
the effort to pull funding ended with the positions being left vacant and relocated inside 
the Domestic Policy Council. 
Why are Presidents Using Czars?  
 Considering the level of controversy czars can evoke, an observer of 
contemporary presidential politics can reasonably ask, why do presidents persist in using 
them to manage policy implementation and coordination? I argue that this institutional 
development is linked to the dynamics of presidential expectations and how presidents 
have sought to meet those expectations by exerting control over the federal bureaucracy 
through actions such as politicization and centralization. Noting that expectations far 
outstrip presidential performance capacity, Terry Moe (1985, 269) argued in a landmark 
essay that presidents have a strong incentive to adjust their administrative apparatus in 
such a way that maximizes their control over what John Hart (1995) has called “the 
presidential branch” and, thus, further enhances the effectiveness of their policy making 
process. As a result, presidents have embraced two distinct administrative strategies, 
centralization and politicization, both of which help generate the kind of opportunities 
presidents need. As administrative phenomena, centralization and politicization are 
complementary yet quite conceptually distinct (see Rudalevige and Lewis 2005). 
 According to Andrew Rudalevige (2003, 141), centralization occurs when there is 
“a shift in functions from the wider executive bureaucracy to the Executive Office of the 
President, particularly the White House Office itself.” Rudalevige shows how this 
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practice is linked to the expectations gap, noting that as expectations outstrip capacity, as 
argued by Moe, presidents must seek to expand their capacity.  Further, since the reach of 
the presidency “is institutionally (and constitutionally) limited, [presidents] act to build 
and shape what is within their grasp, namely the executive offices and the White House” 
(Rudalevige 2002, 6). In other words, by bringing government work previously done 
outside of the auspices of the Executive Office of the President, presidents centralize the 
work by bringing it within the fold of the presidential branch, with the goal of solidifying 
control over its operation. 
 To politicize, on the other hand, refers to staffing practices that prize political and 
ideological leadership over neutral competence, and frequently takes the form of either 
layering political appointees over career civil service positions already in existence or 
replacing career bureaucrats with loyal appointees (see Heclo 1975; Lewis 2005). Just as 
centralization is consistent with a rational presidential approach to organizational 
management for the reasons discussed above, politicization marks an attempt by 
presidents to close the expectations gap by ensuring that the men and women working for 
them will have the president’s preferences—or at least be more likely to have the same 
shared preferences—when making engaging in the governing process. 
 The end result of this centralization and politicization over time has been an 
expanded institution, increasing the amount of work the presidency was able to produce 
while simultaneously creating an ever-more complex managerial challenge for the 
president.  Samuel Kernell (1999, 39) reports an illuminating anecdote concerning James 
Rowe, one of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s original assistants: when Rowe returned from 
World War II, “he called a friend in the Truman White House to ask how things had 
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changed. He recalled later that they had ‘nine people doing what I used to do’ and 
guessed that ‘nowadays they must have 300 or 400 doing what I used to do.’” This 
expansion eventually slowed and, to some extent, reversed course following the 
controversial actions of some of Richard Nixon’s staff members.  Indeed, after Nixon, 
making claims that they would reduce the size of the president’s staff became a 
predictable presidential trend, with Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton all 
making the promise to do so. Nevertheless, the managerial requirements continued to 
expand, as did the organizational girth of the presidency; research by George Krause 
(2004) shows the size and scope of the presidential branch increased more than eight-fold 
from 1939 to 1997; at the high point in 1961, the increase was almost 13 ½ times the size 
and scope of what was in place 1939’s nadir.5 Furthermore, Krause shows how this 
personnel growth has actually hampered presidential policy leadership, drawing an 
inverse correlation between institutional girth and presidential capacity to develop, 
propose, and enact public policy. The conclusion here is one that suggests the president’s 
problem, at least when it comes to the balance between management and policy 
leadership, is one of too much institutional growth resulting in sclerotic policy 
performance and effectiveness. A major factor in this disjunction has been the frequent 
absence of high-quality coordination.  As the number of individuals and agencies evolve 
and expand in the presidential branch, it has become increasingly difficult for presidents 
to muster their administrative troops in efficient and productive ways.  
Coordinating the Presidency: The Role of the Czars 
 As the president attempts to increase the White House’s policy leadership efforts 
and to convert administrative entities outside of the chief executive’s control into 
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agencies and organizations populated by the president’s political allies and contained 
within the organizational confines of the Executive Office of the President, the task of 
managing all this activity and all these active participants becomes enormous.  According 
to James Pfiffner (2009):  
The coordination role is the most important role of the White House staff; and 
talented people are necessary to do the job.  That being said, too much 
centralization and too many White House staffers can impair effective presidential 
leadership.  White House staffers are ambitious people, and may try to use the 
president’s power as their own.  Thus the White House staff must be carefully 
policed and kept on a short leash. 
Consensus of the role of czars as coordinators extends across numerous groups, 
from scholars of politics and the law to government servants, including both former czars 
and presidents themselves. Pfiffner’s (2009) testimony before a Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs hearing on the subject of czars moved 
from the theoretical to descriptive of what presidents use czars to do.  Pfiffner notes that 
presidents designate czars to coordinate policymaking across different groups, and that in 
doing so, czars play essential roles and lift the burden of coordination from the executive, 
helping to reduce the broad range of options available to presidents to necessary 
essentials. In a statement before the same hearing, former Pennsylvania Governor and 
later the nation’s first Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge (2009) commented on 
the fifteen months he spent between those two positions as George W. Bush’s Homeland 
Security czar.6  In it, he references his role in coordinating authority, as well as political 
and legal questions about any efforts he may have made beyond that role.  
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 Commentary from the White House regarding czars echoes this focus on 
coordination.  In a White House blog post pushing back against czar-related criticism, 
former Obama Administration White House Communications Director Anita Dunn 
(2009) highlighted the coordinator role of czars as she rejected claims that the positions 
under attack were inappropriate or even novel. This echoes the focus on coordination by 
several presidents.  For example, in a message explaining why he was vetoing legislation 
that would create a federal drug czar, Ronald Reagan (1983) noted that the aim of the 
legislation (The Violent Crime and Drug Enforcement Improvements Act of 1982) was to 
promote coordination of national drug policy. Later, after the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988 formally created the drug czar position (known formally as director of the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy), George H.W. Bush announced his first czar, former 
Reagan-era Secretary of Education William Bennett, in a February 1989 press event and 
noted the scope of the task to be accomplished, saying that Bennett “has a big 
assignment—a big one.  And a lot of it is coordinative (Bush 1989b).” A month later, in a 
speech before the National Legislative Conference on the Independent Insurance Agents 
of America, Bush (1989c) repeated the sentiment as he noted, “When you look at the 
complexity of the Federal Government and the number of the agencies that are involved 
in this question of anti-narcotics, it is a massive executive, coordinative job.” Later that 
fall, Bush (1989a) expanded on the specifics of the task: 
One of the roles of the drug czar … is coordination.  And we have had meetings 
around our Cabinet table to try to cope with bureaucratic competition that exists.  
I can’t tell you we’ve got it whipped.  I can tell you we’ve made progress.  But I 
think from a management standpoint the drug czar, with the full confidence of the 
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President, offers the best hope to be able to have us minimize, if not eliminate, the 
rivalries that sometimes have adversely affected the concerted effort. 
A similar emphasis on the coordinative purpose of czars has been made by every 
subsequent presidential administration.  For example, in an April 1993 press conference, 
Clinton Administration White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers (1993) responded 
to queries about the president’s commitment to drug enforcement by highlighting his 
decision to elevate the drug czar to Cabinet status, before going on to note the job would 
then entail coordinating drug policy efforts across three different agencies and 
departments with varying drug-related responsibilities. Later, during the George W. Bush 
Administration, the president actually interrupted a reporter posing a question about 
uncertainty over whether the new administration will continue the practice of the 
preceding administration with respect to having an AIDS czar, saying, “Well, there’s 
going to be a focus on AIDS, and people can apply any title they want. But there’s going 
to be a person in my office who has got the responsibility of coordinating the AIDS 
policy throughout the Federal Government” (Bush 2001.) Similarly, when pressed for 
details about the role of the newly named border czar during an interview with Juan 
Carlos Lopez of CNN En Epanol, Barack Obama (2009) responded: 
Well, the goal of the border czar is to help coordinate all the various agencies that 
fall under the Department of Homeland Security and—so that we are confident 
that the border patrols are working effectively with ICS, working effectively with 
our law enforcement agencies.  So he’s really a coordinator that can be 
responsible to Secretary Napolitano and, ultimately directly accountable to me. 
Four Key Determinants of Czar Success 
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 Czars may be accountable to their presidents, as Obama suggests above, but 
presidents have their own responsibilities when it comes to ensuring their czars are able 
to accomplish their assigned missions. Having discussed what czars are and why 
presidents use them, the question remains: how can presidents utilize these administrators 
in the most effective way possible? After all, presidents care about outcomes, and the 
nature of the administrative task that czars are handed is one fraught with complexity and 
obstacles to the extent that future presidents should consider how they can make their 
new czars more likely to succeed, rather than optimistically assuming success while 
attempting to sidestep failure and controversy.  In doing so, presidents should consider 
four key determinants of czar success: clarity, expertise, analysis, and access.  Each of 
these concepts is distinct, but also importantly intertwined.  In other words, a president 
who makes sure to emphasize access and expertise but does not offer clarity or 
commitment will likely only marginally increase a new czar’s chances for success. 
Clarity 
 The first task for any president contemplating the establishment of a new 
coordinator within their administration is to first determine what precisely it is that they 
want this new official to do.  Without clarity of purpose, any czar will spend their time 
spinning wheels rather than helping to solve the newly prioritized policy problem that 
prompted their position.  Moreover, if the function of a czar is not clear to the rest of the 
administration, the new official will have increased difficulty managing across agencies 
and offices not directly under their control on official organizational flowcharts.  In the 
meantime, outside observers may question the czar’s authority, which can lead to 
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contradictory signals emanating from different administrative surrogates attempting to 
tamp down criticism. 
 The experience of the trio of AIDS czars that populated Bill Clinton’s 
administration at different points provides arguably the best cautionary tale about what 
happens when presidents put forward a new czar without first clarifying their purpose.7  
Although Clinton was the first president to promise the creation of a czar position on the 
campaign trail, the support his administration ultimately provided to his AIDS czars 
indicates that pledge was more about separating his campaign opponent, George H.W. 
Bush, from potential moderate votes than a sincere interest in creating a robust 
institutional response to the AIDS epidemic.  For instance, Clinton’s first AIDS Czar, 
Kristine Gebbie, would wind up as a symbol of the president’s commitment to fighting 
the disease rather than an actual player in the administration’s tentative efforts.  Part of 
this lack of stature was due to limited contact with the president, but commentary 
surrounding her departure in July 1994 indicated the larger problem: lack of clarity over 
her position’s mission.  Indeed, observers noted that a less well defined job had never 
before been seen, and as her tenure as AIDS czar concluded Gebbie would meet with 
White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta about the need to better define her position, 
initially for her benefit, and later for the benefit of whoever would replace her.  
Unfortunately, these conversations ultimately proved fruitless and subsequent AIDS czars 
under not just the Clinton Administration but the Obama Administration as well would 
labor in situations of uncertainty about the precise nature of their role and authority. 
Expertise 
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 Commitment to solving policy problems and clarity about what is needed from an 
administrative perspective is not enough, however, to ensure a czar’s success; the 
president must also ensure that the person chosen to be czar has the skills and expertise 
required for the task.  Expertise in the issue at hand is tremendously important; without it, 
a new czar can not only be ill equipped to make good decisions but also suffer from a 
lack of credibility with key constituencies related to one’s new mission.  For example, 
despite an impressive record of public service, Intelligence Czar John Negroponte had 
little experience dealing with the Intelligence Community prior to taking his position atop 
it in February 2007.  This lack of experience hobbled his legitimacy with groups such as 
a key organization that represented 9/11 victims’ families, the same organization that had 
proved essential in advancing the legislation that created the National Director of 
Intelligence position in the first place.  Combined with other actions by the Bush 
Administration that undermined Negroponte’s authority, this perception of inexperience 
in the field hampered him throughout his time as NDI.8 
 Substantive experience alone, however, does not ensure success.  Few czars have 
had as much expertise in their area as Drug Czar Jerome Jaffe, who served as head of the 
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse from 1971-1973.9  Despite exceptional credentials, 
Jaffe had little managerial experience and proved to be administratively incompetent, 
consequently allowing his organization to drift in a way that would have reverberations 
throughout not only the Nixon Administration but through the current state of the War on 
Drugs, as enforcement-side policies and programs came to dominate treatment-based 
approaches to the national drug problem, which Jaffe was supposed to be leading. 
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 In both cases, inexperience and lack of expertise led to perceptions of illegitimacy 
and hampered organizational performance, leading to abrupt ends to each individual’s 
tenure as czar and undermining their respective administrations’ abilities to solve the 
problems with which they were tasked. 
Analysis 
 Once a czar has been selected and announced, it often proves difficult for them to 
hit the ground running in their new positions.  The offices they helm are typically new 
organizations, and what few staffers they may command usually have been reassigned 
from other departments with organizational experience and loyalties that may not be fully 
aligned with the needs and preferences of their new boss.  One strategy to allow a czar to 
satisfy coordination and leadership expectations would be to have them spend a limited 
period early on analyzing the problem and constructing a national strategy designed to 
solve it.  Doing so not only allows for an opportunity to identify comprehensively what 
steps need to be taken to solve the problem at hand, but also provides the new czar a 
change to liaise with other relevant agencies, build relationships with key stakeholders, 
and assess who in the relevant policy community might be an ally and who might be an 
obstacle before getting to the business of implementation.  Heading such a strategic 
process can also help convey legitimacy on the new czar, particularly in the absence of 
statutory authority, by providing opportunity for them to build a profile while also 
receiving feedback from vested interests such as members of Congress, policy activists, 
and industrial elites who will likely prove instrumental in putting thought into action 
down the road. 
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 Some of the most notable czar success stories have begun with this type of 
strategic process.  For example, Bill Bennett, the first director of the Office of National 
Drug Policy, spent the opening 180 days of his new position designing the 
congressionally mandated national strategy for fighting the war on drugs.  This 
assignment—and the generous yet still limited time frame that went with it—provided 
two opportunities for Bennett that his immediate predecessors and successors did not 
have: it gave him a purpose to travel throughout the country seeking input while also 
advancing arguments in favor of the George H.W. Bush Administration’s goals and also 
enabled his staff to ground the new national strategy within his own philosophical 
framework.  This combination of an enhanced profile and the ability to shape the policies 
that would be implemented by his office enabled Bennett to consolidate influence and 
control in a way few others have.  Ironically, Bennett abruptly departed the 
administration just as the position was transitioning from program design to 
implementation.  His replacement, Florida Governor Bob Martinez, was then thrust into a 
position of managing another individual’s plan, without the benefit of the relationship-
building period Bennett enjoyed. 
 Additional insight into the value of such a process can be found by the various 
experiences of George W. Bush’s trio of national security-related czars: Homeland 
Security Czar Tom Ridge, Intelligence Czar John Negroponte, and War Czar Douglas 
Lute.  Like Bennett, Ridge’s first task was to create a national homeland security 
strategy, though in this case it was not congressionally mandated. Helming the 
construction of the new national strategy provided an opportunity for Ridge to shape the 
institutional structures he would later oversee as the nation’s first Secretary of Homeland 
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Security. Moreover, it also provided an opportunity for Bush to travel the nation 
emphasizing the importance of Ridge’s mission and increasing the appearance of his 
influence. Conversely, the experiences of Negroponte and Lute were such that they either 
never had the opportunity to structure the government’s response to the problem that 
prompted their position or the opportunity they did receive came too late.  Negroponte, 
for example, came into his position after a pair of high-profile commissions studying the 
intelligence failures involved in the 9/11 terrorist attacks had issued reports containing a 
litany of reform suggestions, including the establishment of what would become 
Negroponte’s position, the Director of National Intelligence.  In other words, 
Negroponte’s selection itself was in response to strategic review work done elsewhere, 
and the new intelligence czar would instead be thrust into the position of executing plans 
he did not help originate.  General Lute’s experience as war czar was different than 
Negroponte’s as intelligence czar, yet equally limiting.  Unlike Negroponte, he was given 
the opportunity to conduct an exhaustive review, in this case of the nation’s war-fighting 
efforts in Afghanistan.  However, this opportunity came after Lute had been in his 
position for nearly one year, and only a few months before the nation would vote for 
Bush’s presidential successor.  Further, it would conclude after the 2008 election and 
only be presented to Bush’s National Security Council at one of that group’s final 
meetings during the Bush presidency, and less than eight weeks before Barack Obama’s 
inauguration.  Although Obama would surprise many by announcing that Lute would stay 
on as war czar in the new administration, another strategy review would also be 
announced, one that Lute was not in charge of leading and which led to reform proposals 
not in line with his preferences. 
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Access 
 After the ability to influence their own mission, a successful czar needs to have 
the organizational clout to wrangle potentially disinclined officials and implement their 
(and the president’s) preferred policy solutions.  This clout derives primarily, if not 
exclusively, from one access to the president, both real and perceived.  With access 
comes evidence that the czar is speaking with the president’s voice. Conversely, a czar 
who rarely encounters the president is unlikely to be viewed by other administration 
officials as essential to obey, if not impossible to ignore.  The modern presidency is thick 
with examples of czars who enjoyed this kind of access and those who did not, and a 
clear pattern concerning their individual impacts underscores the need for presidents to 
keep their doors and ears open to those they elevate to czar positions.  For example, few 
if any czars have had the access to the president that Energy Czar William Simon had to 
Richard Nixon.10 Nixon conveyed authority to Simon on par with that of Albert Speer’s 
role in the Third Reich (Nixon’s own unfortunate metaphor), clout that Simon utilized 
when he decided to over-allocate oil and gas throughout the nation following the energy 
crisis, a high-risk decision that ultimately paid dividends and was only possible because 
of Nixon’s empowerment. 
 Simon’s experience was in direct contrast to that of the man he replaced as energy 
czar, former Colorado Governor John Love.  Though Love was initially brought into the 
Nixon Administration to serve as a high-profile bureaucratic response to concerns about 
the national security consequences of the nation’s growing reliance on foreign oil, he 
never truly gelled with the rest of the administration.  His status as an outsider was only 
reinforced and exacerbated as he proceeded to give unpopular advice to the president.  By 
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the time Simon eclipsed him as Nixon’s chief energy policy coordinator in 1973, Love’s 
ability to get the president’s attention was at its nadir, and with it his ability to influence 
meaningfully the administration’s response to a wide range of energy-related problems. 
Conclusion 
 As expectations for presidential leadership continue to grow and as complexity of 
legislation and the federal government continue to leave presidents in need of widespread 
coordinative assistance, policy czars represent one potentially useful albeit controversial 
and imperfect solution. With thoughtful dedication to structure and mission, along with a 
commitment to political transparency, future presidents may be able to utilize policy 
czars in a way that allows them to accomplish their managerial objectives while 
minimizing political challenges and perceptions of illegitimacy. Ultimately, for 
proponents and critics of czars alike, it is in the interest of every American to have a 
government that functions smoothly and effectively, rather than one where chances for 
policy success slip away into the cracks and cleavages between its branches and 
bifurcations. Until Congress takes action to either provide presidents with the level of 
coordinative support they need or restructure the government in a manner that reduces 
that need, policy czars represent an opportunity for presidents to meet the heroic 
expectations they face.  
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1 See congressional testimony from James Pfiffner (2009) and Bradley Patterson (2009) 
for similar definitions that also hinge on the lack of Senate confirmation.  
2 At the same time, Congress may choose to allow the president to appoint certain 
“inferior” officers without Senate confirmation.  Officers that do not require Senate 
advice and consent are presumed to serve in an advisory or support role. 
3 See the first chapter of Sollenberger and Rozell’s 2012 book and their 2012 article 
(name order reversed) in Congress & the Presidency for more thorough treatments of 
their legal argument.  
4 See Sollenberger and Rozell (2012, Chapter One) for an in-depth discussion of the 
relevant legislation and court decisions that further constrain White House structure and 
presidential staffing options. 
5 Krause employs a compelling yet unique measure for his concept of organizational size 
and scope (i.e., girth): overall EOP expenditures, rather than personnel figures. Krause 
notes that this measurement approach possesses advantages over personnel data. First, 
EOP staffing data can be misleading as positions and corresponding personnel can be 
shifted around, whereas expenditure data allows researchers to account for both the labor 
and capital components involved in the administrative dimensions of the presidency. 
Regardless of one’s preference for personnel or expenditure data, the trend identified by 
Krause is unmistakable and suggestive. 
6 Technically, Ridge’s title was United States Homeland Security Advisor, but 
acknowledges in the referenced testimony the czar moniker.  
7 For an in-depth analysis of the evolution of the AIDS Czar, see Vaughn and Villalobos 
(forthcoming, chapter five). 
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8 For an in-depth analysis of George W. Bush’s use of various national security czars 
after September 11th, 2001, including Intelligence Czar, Homeland Security Czar, and 
War Czar, see Vaughn and Villalobos (forthcoming, chapter six). 
9 For an in-depth analysis of the evolution of the Drug Czar, see Vaughn and Villalobos 
(forthcoming, chapter four). 
10 For an in-depth analysis of the history of the Energy Czar, see Vaughn and Villalobos 
(forthcoming, chapter three). 
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